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Peter McDonald1 
Meimanat Hosseini-Chavoshi2 
Mohammad Jalal Abbasi-Shavazi3 
Arash Rashidian4 
Abstract  
BACKGROUND  
In 2013 a draft population bill was introduced in the Iranian Parliament. Based on the 
presumption that fertility in Iran had fallen to a very low level, the bill proposed a wide 
range of pronatalist policies with the aim of increasing fertility to 2.5 births per woman. 
The draft law called for restrictions on the employment of women and young single 
people and inducements for women to marry in their late teens. New estimates of 
fertility, such as those provided in this paper, cast doubt upon the view that fertility had 
fallen to a very low level. In May 2014 a statement issued by the Supreme Leader 
provided guidelines for a more moderate approach to sustaining fertility at around the 
replacement level.  
 
OBJECTIVE  
To measure the trend in fertility in Iran, especially from 2000 onwards.  
 
METHODS  
Using the 2010 IDHS, the synthetic cohort parity progression ratio method is used to 
measure the fertility trend in Iran. Synthetic parity progressions are compared with real 
cohort parity progressions to examine the presence of tempo effects. Comparison is 
made with age-based measures from surveys, censuses, and the birth registration 
system.  
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RESULTS 
This paper demonstrates that fertility in Iran was constant for the decade 2000–2009, at 
a level of around 1.8–2.0 births per woman.  
 
CONCLUSIONS  
Our findings provide evidence supporting a more moderate approach to sustaining 
fertility in Iran at around the replacement level.  
 
COMMENTS  
The paper demonstrates the advantages of parity-based measurement over age-based 
measurement when tempo effects may be involved. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction  
Iran has experienced one of the most rapid falls in fertility ever recorded. The observed 
pattern is one in which fertility fell simultaneously in all age groups, in all geographic 
settings, and in all social groups, hence accounting for the rapidity of the decline at the 
national level. From a high of 7.0 births per woman in the early 1980s, fertility fell to 
5.5 in 1988 and, with the introduction of the government family planning program in 
1990, to 2.8 by the mid-1990s. The 2000 Iran Demographic and Health Survey (IDHS) 
indicated that the fertility rate declined further, reaching near-replacement level by 
2000. However, some leveling off of the fertility decline near replacement level was 
indicated from analysis of the 2006 Census using the own-children method (Abbasi-
Shavazi et al. 2009). 
In 2011 the United Nations Population Division published its World Population 
Prospects: The 2010 Revision. In this report the Iranian TFR was estimated to have 
fallen from 1.96 in 2000–2005, a level consistent with the analysis of Abbasi-Shavazi et 
al. (2009), to 1.77 in 2005–2010 and to 1.59 in 2010–2015. It was then projected to fall 
to 1.34 by 2025–2030 in the medium variant projection and to an extraordinarily low 
0.84 in the low variant projection (Figure 1). Iran’s population was projected to fall 
from 74.0 million in 2010 to 62.1 million in 2100 according to the medium variant and 
to 31.4 million according to the low variant. These numbers provided some support to 
already existing concerns about low fertility in parts of the then conservative Iranian 
Government, leading to the introduction of a draft pronatalist bill in the Iranian 
parliament. The draft bill, among numerous other provisions, called for restrictions on 
the employment of women and young single people and inducements for women to 
marry in their late teens. Subsequently, the United Nations Population Division revised 
its estimates and projections of Iran’s fertility in World Population Projections: The 
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2012 Revision, with fertility in the 21st century never falling below 1.83 in the medium 
variant (Figure 1). While the UN, in the light of more recent data, has revised its 
estimates upwards substantially, there are still claims that Iran’s TFR was as low as 1.5 
in 2011 (Erfani 2014). 
In the conclusion to our book on the fall of fertility in Iran (Abbasi et al. 2009), we 
speculated that economic uncertainty would lead to delay of first marriage and/or first 
births in the immediate future and this would produce a tempo effect leading to even 
lower fertility in the future. We considered that the long-held cultural beliefs that 
women should marry early and have their first baby soon after marriage would fade. In 
this paper we use data from the 2010 Iran Demographic and Health Survey to update 
estimates of fertility in Iran. Counter to our earlier speculation of falling fertility after 
2000, we conclude that fertility in Iran was near-to-constant in the decade 2000–2010, 
and close to the replacement level. We conclude also that the ages at first marriage and 
first birth remained constant. To reduce the potential that the cross-sectional age-based 
total fertility rate may be affected by changes in the timing of births, especially by an 
observed widening of the interval between the first and the second birth (Abbasi-
Shavazi et al. 2009), we examine fertility trends using parity progression ratios. We also 
examine changes in spacing for each birth interval and then the overall impact on the 
total fertility rate derived from parity progressions. 
 
Figure 1: Total Fertility Rate Assumptions for Iran, United Nations Population 
Division, World Population Prospects, 2010 and 2012 Revisions 
 
 
Source: UN, Dept. of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division: World Population Prospects DEMOBASE extract. 2014. 
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2. Measurement using parity progression ratios 
The general trend for age-specific fertility rates during the period 1976–2006 was that 
they moved in the same direction as the total fertility rate at all ages. When the rate of 
fertility rose, it rose at all ages; when it fell, it fell at all ages (Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 
2009). These trends have focused interpretation of the changes in fertility on the impact 
of cross-sectional social and political changes. However, the age-based model is not 
informative in relation to changes in the timing of successive births. Age-specific 
fertility rates and their sum, the total fertility rate, use age as a controlling or 
standardizing factor because the age structure of the population changes from year to 
year. However, age is not the only structural feature of a population that can influence 
the number of births in a given year. The other important structural features are the 
distribution of women according to the number of children that they already have, that 
is, their parity and the time since the most recent birth. 
To better assess the impact on period fertility of changes in the timing of births, the 
synthetic parity progression method provides an alternative to the conventional age-
based approach to the study of fertility. In this method the control used is not age but 
parity in association with the time since the most recent birth (Feeney 1983; Feeney and 
Yu 1987; Ni Bhrolchain 1987; Rallu and Toulemon 1994; Hinde 1998: Chapter 9). It is 
argued that analysis by parity and duration since last birth facilitates interpretation of 
fertility trends because people make their decisions about having a child on the basis of 
the number of children that they already have, rather than simply on how old they are. 
Duration since the last birth is a much better predictor of whether and when a woman 
will have her next birth than is her age (McDonald and Kippen 2011). The synthetic 
parity progression method has been applied successfully to a number of Asian 
countries, including in our previous study of Iran (Hosseini-Chavoshi et al. 2006; 
Spoorenberg 2010, 2013; Spoorenberg and Dommaraju 2012). The limitations of the 
age-based TFR and the superiority of parity-based measures have been described by 
Sobotka and Lutz (2009). The innovation in this paper is that we demonstrate the value 
of comparing results from synthetic and real cohorts using the parity progression 
approach. 
 
 
3. Parity progression ratios in this study 
In the literature, three main approaches to the analysis of fertility using parity have been 
used (Ni Bhrolchain 1987; Hinde 1998: Chapter 9): parity progression for birth or 
marriage cohorts, true parity cohorts, and synthetic parity progression. The current 
paper aims to explore the patterns and the quantum and tempo of fertility over the last 
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two decades in Iran using parity progression ratios by duration since marriage or since 
the previous birth for both real and synthetic cohorts. As fertility outside marriage is 
negligible in Iran, the date of first marriage is a reliable starting point for analysis. 
To derive lifetime parity progression rates for any parity, based on the literature 
(Feeney and Yu 1987, Ni Bhrolchain 1987) we assume that cumulated experience by 
the end of the 10th year after the previous birth is sufficient to approximate a lifetime. 
An examination of the Iran DHS data confirms that the number of births occurring ten 
or more years after the previous birth is negligible. 
To obtain estimates for real parity cohorts, we measure the proportion of women 
giving birth in a given year who progress to the next birth within the following ten 
years. For example, for the group of women who had their first birth in 1999, we 
measure the proportion that had a second birth by 2009.  
In the calculation of synthetic parity progression ratios, we bring together all those 
who had a birth of a given parity in a particular calendar year and measure the 
probability that they would do this given the time since their previous birth. These 
probabilities are then combined into a summary synthetic measure for all durations 
since the previous birth. 
To assess the importance of quantum and tempo effects for each parity 
progression, we compare the progression ratios for real cohorts with the ratios for the 
cross-sectional synthetic cohorts. We do this by comparing the value for a real cohort 
with the value for the synthetic cohort four years later, on the basis that the mean 
duration to the next birth is around four years, irrespective of the initial parity. This 
comparison is illustrated in the Lexis diagram (Figure 2). This mirrors the procedure 
that is used to identify quantum and tempo effects in the age-based total fertility rate by 
plotting the real cohort value at the year of birth of the cohort plus the mean age at 
childbearing (usually around 27 years after the women in the cohort were born) 
(McDonald and Kippen 2011). In relation to the first birth, the progression from first 
marriage is used. In this case, however, the mean duration is only three years, and so in 
the comparison of the synthetic and real measures we use only a three-year gap.  
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Figure 2: Lexis diagram depiction of the comparison of the real 1999 cohort 
(diagonal) with the 2003 synthetic cohort (vertical) 
 
 
 
4. Total fertility rates derived from parity progression ratios 
When births outside marriage can be assumed to be negligible, for any synthetic cohort 
the total fertility rate can be calculated from the combination of the progression ratios 
for that calendar year using a life table approach to derive the final parity distribution of 
the cohort and calculating the mean completed parity (see Hosseini-Chavoshi et al. 
2006). This procedure also requires estimates of the proportion of the cohort that 
marries and of those that do not marry and are assumed to have no children. For all 
synthetic cohorts we assume that 10% never married. This is consistent with the 
estimates across time found in the synthetic percentages never marrying, as described 
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later in the paper. Progressions to the ninth and higher-order births were not included, 
so the calculated total fertility rates are slightly underestimated. 
We have also derived a total fertility rate from the real cohort parity progressions. 
We do this by combining the parity progressions for real parity cohorts that began their 
experience in the same calendar year. For example, taking 1999 as the calendar year of 
commencement, we have estimates of the proportion that progress from marriage to the 
first birth between 1999 and 2009, the proportion that progress from the first birth to the 
second birth in the same time period, and so on. These progressions can be combined in 
the same way as just described for synthetic cohorts to produce a total fertility rate, 
again assuming for all cohorts that 10% never marry. The resultant total fertility rate is 
the rate that would result if a marriage cohort of women experienced the real cohort 
parity progressions throughout their lives that applied across the given 10-year time 
period. 
We compare the two total fertility rates (synthetic parity progressions derived from 
one calendar year and synthetic based on real cohort parity progressions), again with a 
four-year interval, as shown in Figure 1. Our contention is that each individual real 
cohort parity progression is free of tempo effects (variations due only to changes in the 
timing of births). Thus, when the real cohort progressions are combined into a total 
fertility rate, that rate will also be relatively free of tempo effects. Hence the 
comparison of the two total fertility rates will provide an indication of the extent to 
which the annual synthetic measure is affected by tempo rather than quantum. This 
enables us to assess the reliability of the most recent annual synthetic cohort total 
fertility rates, the most recent aggregate measures of fertility that are available. 
 
 
5. Source of data 
The source of data for this paper is the 2010 Iran Multiple-Indicators Demographic and 
Health Survey (IDHS). Conducted in 2010, the survey is composed of a representative 
sample of households throughout the country (Ministry of Health and Medical 
Education 2010). The sample included 31,350 households with a 94.4% response rate 
(optimized for the proportions of households in urban and rural areas). Systematic 
cluster sampling was utilized to randomly select 10 households in each cluster. A 
structured supervision program and vertical training were undertaken to guarantee the 
quality of the data collection. The interviewers contacted 35,305 women aged 15–54 
and were able to complete interviews with 98% of eligible women (34,438). Three 
cases were dropped from the analysis due to inconsistent information in their birth 
histories. After weighting, the cases available for analysis numbered 35,839. 
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Household data, including date of birth and marital status, are available for all 
members of each household. Information on reproductive behavior is obtained for all 
ever-married women aged 15–54, including the timing of all live births. This 
information and the very large size of the sample allowed us to calculate parity 
progression probabilities for each calendar year from 1980 to 2010 by parity and single 
year of duration from the previous birth.  
 
 
6. Presentation of results 
For each birth interval, we show the synthetic parity progression ratio for the years 
1990–2009. The value for the real parity progression ratio for the cohort that had its 
previous birth M years before the year to which the synthetic value applies is plotted 
against the same year as the synthetic value. M is three years for the progression from 
marriage to the first birth and four years for all other progressions. We also compare the 
mean duration of the birth interval for both real and synthetic cohorts with the same lag 
or gap. The analysis shows that the mean duration widens for most birth intervals across 
the years of comparison due to changes in the spacing of births in Iran. However, with 
the exception of the interval between marriage and first birth, for which the average 
interval for the 20 years is about three years, all the other Iranian birth intervals average 
out across time at about four years, thus explaining our choice of the values of M. 
Where the real and the synthetic progressions overlap, we conclude there is little or 
no tempo effect. In these circumstances we expect to see that the mean duration curves 
for the synthetic and real cohorts also overlap. In the period when birth spacing 
widened, the 1990s, we expect to see a tempo effect due to the delay of births. This will 
mean that the synthetic parity progression ratio should be lower than the real parity 
progression ratio. The reverse is implied for the mean durations: we expect that the real 
mean duration between births will be lower than the synthetic mean duration.  
Analysis was carried out for progressions up to and including the progression from 
the seventh to the eighth birth. In the following pages we show the results for the 
progression from marriage to first birth to the progression from the fifth to the sixth 
birth. The results for the progressions from the sixth to the seventh birth and the seventh 
to the eighth birth are very similar to those for the progression from the fifth to the sixth 
birth. The real and synthetic cohort trend for the parity progression ratios and the mean 
durations of intervals are shown in Figures 3–14. The extent of annual fluctuations 
provides an indicator of statistical reliability. 
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6.1 Progression from marriage to first birth 
A three-year lag between the real and synthetic cohorts is used for this interval. For real 
cohorts, the progression from marriage to the first birth has leveled out at a value of 
0.95 (Figure 3). For the 13-year period where the real and synthetic cohorts overlap, 
there is close agreement between the two trends. On this evidence we would expect that 
the synthetic cohort trend is a reliable predictor of the future path of the real cohort 
trend. The synthetic rates fluctuate but show little change in their average level over the 
period 1995–2009. For example, the 2005 level was slightly higher than the 1995 level. 
This suggests that this progression will remain around 0.94 into the future. 
The two curves for the mean duration of the interval between marriage and first 
birth overlap very closely (Figure 4). Taking the two together, this interval increases 
gradually by one year between 1983 and 2009. This gradual increase seems to produce 
very little tempo effect, as the real and synthetic parity progressions overlap closely. 
From about 2004 there was no further widening of this interval. 
 
 
6.2 Progression from first to second birth 
For this progression and all subsequent progressions we use a four-year lag based on 
the average duration across the 30 years of observation. The progression falls from 
close to one for the first real cohort (first birth in 1980, plotted at 1984) to close to 0.8 
for the 1999 real cohort (plotted at 2003). The mean birth interval widened considerably 
in the 1990s (from three to five years). During the 1990s, as expected, there is evidence 
of a small tempo effect in the mean duration as the synthetic cohort runs ahead of the 
real cohort. The spacing increase slowed considerably around the beginning of the 
2000s, ending the tempo effect in the mean duration trend. However, the small tempo 
effect caused by increased spacing did not convert into a noticeable tempo effect in the 
progression trend. From 2005 onwards the synthetic progression seems to have 
flattened out at about the same level already reached by the real cohorts (0.80). The 
expectation is that the real progression will continue at this level into the future. 
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Figure 3: Progression: Marriage to 
1st birth 
 
Figure 4: Mean duration: Marriage 
to 1st birth (years) 
 
Figure 5: Progression: 1st birth to 2nd 
birth  
 
Figure 6: Mean duration: 1st birth to 
2nd birth (years) 
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Figure 7: Progression: 2nd birth to 3rd 
birth 
 
Figure 8: Mean duration: 2nd to 3rd 
birth (years) 
 
Figure 9: Progression: 3rd birth to 4th 
birth 
 
Figure 10: Mean duration: 3rd to 4th 
birth (years) 
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Figure 11: Progression: 4th birth to 5th 
birth 
 
Figure 12: Mean duration: 4th to 5th 
birth (years) 
 
Figure 13: Progression: 5th birth to 6th 
birth 
 
Figure 14: Mean duration: 5th birth to 
6th birth (years) 
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6.3 Progression from second to third birth 
The second to third progression falls from close to one for the first real cohort (second 
birth in 1980) and, given the overlap of the trends for the real and synthetic cohorts, is 
likely to fall to 0.5, the level at which the synthetic cohort stabilized in the years 2005–
2009. Again, there is a sizeable increase in the mean birth interval (close to two years), 
which commences from the beginning of the series and continues to the early 2000s, 
after which it levels off. Again, a small tempo effect is evident for the mean duration 
trend in the 1990s but does not produce a noticeable tempo effect in the progression 
trend. 
 
 
6.4 Progression from third to fourth birth 
The fall in the parity progression is even larger for the third to fourth birth progression, 
from close to one for the 1980 real cohort to 0.4 for the most recent synthetic cohort 
(2009). Once more, the mean duration increases by almost two years between the late 
1980s and the early 2000s but levels off from about 2003. The fall in the parity 
progression seemed to have almost ceased by 2009 and we could expect a progression 
of 0.4 into the future. 
 
 
6.5 Progression fourth to fifth birth 
The progression from the fourth to the fifth birth falls from one for the 1980 real cohort 
and stabilizes around 0.4 for the synthetic cohort from about 2002 onwards. The 
progression for the real cohort has also leveled off in the most recent years available. 
The mean duration has increased continually for the real cohort from about 3.5 years to 
4.5 years over the 20-year period, with no further increase since the early 2000s. The 
best estimate for the future is that this progression will remain at 0.4. 
 
 
6.6 Progression from fifth to sixth birth 
The progression from the fifth to the sixth birth fell from close to one for the 1980 real 
cohort to 0.4 by the latter part of the 1990s and has remained unchanged for about the 
past 10 years of synthetic cohorts and the last five years of real cohorts, although it has 
fluctuated because of small numbers in the sample. For the synthetic cohort there is 
little evidence of change in the mean duration across the full 20 years, although the 
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trend for the real cohorts suggests that this interval may have widened a little in the 
early 1980s. 
 
 
6.7 Summary 
For all parity progressions there is strong evidence of stability in the periods 2004–2009 
and 2003–2009 and strong evidence of stability in the mean duration of birth intervals. 
This provides no support to the proposition that Iran’s fertility fell considerably after 
2005. However, it is necessary to also examine trends in marriage behavior. 
 
 
7. The trend in the proportion of women who ever marry 
Interpretation of the trend in the proportion who ever marry is more difficult to specify 
because, like the age-based TFR, the real and the synthetic cohorts are separated by a 
long period of time, essentially, on average, the mean age at marriage. In the case of 
Iran, this is about 20 years. Derived from single-year of age probabilities of first 
marriage, the synthetic measure of the proportion ever marrying fluctuated in the period 
1987 to 2009 between levels of 97% (1991) and 86% (2002) (Figure 15). There seems 
to have been a slight downward trend in the 1990s, followed by a rising trend in the 
2000s. As described below, these trends are consistent with the changes in age at first 
marriage in these years. The real cohort measure shows a declining trend, falling from 
about 96% for the cohort born in 1967 to 90% for the cohort born in 1975. It is difficult 
to be as definite about the future trend as it was in the case of the parity progressions, 
but the rise in the synthetic proportion in the 2000s suggests that the proportion 
marrying for real cohorts will tend to stabilize at around 0.9. This is also supported by 
the evidence that the percentages never married by age for real cohorts (Figure 16) 
suggest relative stability in age at first marriage for cohorts born from 1981 onwards. 
Indeed, counter to the assumption underlying the draft population bill and our own 
earlier speculation of rising age at first marriage, age at first marriage was slightly 
younger for the 1986 birth cohort compared with the 1981 cohort. This finding is 
confirmed by the census data shown in Table 1, with the percentages never married 
falling at the younger ages between the 2006 and 2011 censuses. A slightly earlier age 
at first marriage and relative constancy of the time between marriage and first birth are 
the central reasons that cross-sectional fertility in Iran did not fall in the 2000s. It 
seems, therefore, that the traditional practice of relatively early marriage followed 
relatively quickly by first birth continues to have force.  
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Table 1: Percentages never married, females, age groups 15–19,  
20–24, and 25–29, censuses of Iran 1976–2011  
Year % Never Married 15–19 20–24 25–29 
1976 65.7 21.4 6.8 
1986 66.5 20.4 9.4 
1996 81.4 39.3 14.8 
2006 83.1 49.7 24.1 
2011 78.9 48.1 28.2 
 
Figure 15: Progression: Birth to first marriage (20-year lag between  
real and synthetic) 
 
 
Figure 16: Proportion never married by age, real birth cohorts 
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8. The Total Fertility Rate 
Both the real and synthetic parity progression ratios can be converted to total fertility 
rates as described above (see also Hosseini-Chavoshi et al. 2006). As already explained, 
the total fertility rate that results from the combination of the real parity progressions in 
a given 10-year period are not ‘real’ in the sense that they represent the lifetime 
experience of a marriage cohort. Instead, it is the total fertility rate that would result if a 
marriage cohort of women experienced the real cohort parity progressions throughout 
their lives that applied at each parity in the given 10-year time period. We contend that 
the total fertility rate measured in this way will be relatively free of tempo effects and 
comparison of the two total fertility rates (synthetic and real-based) will provide an 
indication of the extent to which the annual synthetic measure is affected by tempo 
rather than quantum. This enables us to assess the reliability of the most recent annual 
synthetic cohort total fertility rates. 
The synthetic and real-based total fertility rates are compared in Figure 17 with a 
four-year interval between them, the mean of all birth intervals (as depicted in Figure 
2). The broad conclusion to be drawn from the comparison is that the synthetic TFR 
and the real-based TFR do not differ. This suggests that the synthetic measure is not 
distorted by tempo effects and therefore provides a highly reliable estimate of the future 
level of the real-based measure. Figure 17 shows that the synthetic Total Fertility Rate 
leveled off at about 2.0 births per woman over the years 2005–2009. As all the 
components of the TFR (the progression ratios) had also leveled off in this period, the 
best prediction of future fertility in Iran is that it will hover around replacement level 
into the immediate future.  
 
Figure 17: Total Fertility Rate, Iran, 1984–2009 
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Figure 18: Total Fertility Rate, Iran, 1990–2009 
 
 
The conventional age-based Total Fertility Rate can be calculated from the Iranian 
censuses in 2006 and 2011 and from the household records from the 2010 Iranian DHS 
using the own-children method. These are compared with the synthetic cohort parity-
based TFR in Figure 18 for the years 1990 to 2009. The two curves based on the own-
children method are very similar to each other, at least from 1996 onwards, but are a 
little lower than the synthetic cohort parity TFRs. Importantly, however, all three curves 
show that fertility in Iran has remained largely unchanged since 2002 at a level around 
the replacement level. The own-children estimate from the DHS was 1.87 in 2009. The 
TFR calculated from age-specific fertility rates derived from the DHS pregnancy 
history data was 1.84 for the years 2005–2009, but it is considered that infants that died 
very quickly after birth tend to be omitted from women’s reports of their pregnancy 
history. Avery et al. (2013) have argued that the own-children estimates of fertility from 
the household records of DHS surveys may be more reliable than estimates based on 
pregnancy histories in the same survey because DHS surveys are more likely to 
interview higher fertility women. This does not appear to have been the case in the 
Iranian DHS. 
Another source of information is Iran’s vital registration system, now considered 
by the Civil Registration Organization to be near complete in respect of births. Using 
the 2011 Census as a source for the numbers of women by age, the TFRs based on birth 
registration were 1.87 in 2009 and 1.85 in 2010 and 2011 (Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2013).  
In summary, a conclusion can be drawn that fertility in Iran was near-to-constant 
from 2002 to 2009 at a level of around 1.8–2.0 births per woman. There is no evidence 
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that fertility fell as low as 1.5 births per woman or that Iranian fertility can be expected 
to fall to such a level in the immediate future.  
 
 
9. Historical description of the Iranian fertility decline 
Another conclusion to be drawn from the above analysis is that the synthetic parity 
progression ratios provide a good basis for describing the historical decline in fertility 
in Iran in terms of parity progressions (Figure 19, method explained in Hosseini-
Chavoshi et al. 2006). Changes in the progressions to marriage and to the first birth 
played little part in the spectacular Iranian fertility decline, together accounting for a 
fall of only about 0.5 of a birth between 1990 and 2009. Changes in progressions from 
the fourth birth onwards played almost no role. Almost all the decline is accounted for 
by changes in the progressions to the second, third, and fourth births, which together 
account for a fall of about 2.7 births per woman. The effect in the early years of the 
family planning program was strongest for the progressions from the second to third 
birth and the third to the fourth birth. However, Figure 19 shows that there was little 
change in any of the effects from 2002 onwards. 
 
Figure 19: Decomposition of the fall in fertility in Iran from 1990 to 2009 into 
components due to each parity progression, based on synthetic 
cohort parity analysis 
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For the most recent synthetic cohort (2009) the distribution across completed 
parities is quite wide: 33.7% had fewer than two births, 34.1% had two births, and 
32.2% had three or more births (Table 2). This partly reflects the continuing regional 
variations in fertility. 
 
Table 2: Completed parity distribution of Iranian women based on the 2009 
synthetic parity cohort (average of 2.01 births per woman) 
 
Never Married 
Final Number of Children for Ever Married Women 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6+ Total 
% 10.2 6.5 17.0 34.1 19.6 8.2 2.5 1.9 100.0 
 
 
10. Conclusion 
The analysis has shown how comparison of real and synthetic parity progression ratios 
can enhance understanding of a society’s fertility history in terms of tempo and 
quantum and how it can clarify the most recent trends in fertility. The approach 
capitalizes on the argument that parity in combination with duration since the previous 
birth are much better predictors of when and whether a woman will give birth than is 
her current age. Of course, adding age as a third component would further enhance the 
accuracy, but this requires an exceptionally large sample in order to avoid small cell 
sizes. In application to Iran, the method is also enhanced by the fact that the number of 
births outside marriage is negligible and that the progression from marriage to first birth 
is near universal and relatively rapid. In the absence of change in age at marriage - as 
seems to have been the case in Iran in recent years - this means that the age distribution 
at first birth and its incidence is near to constant. Variations in fertility are then 
dependent only on the well-measured inter-birth parity progression ratios. In these 
circumstances the total fertility rates for ‘real-based’ and synthetic marriage cohorts can 
be compared conveniently, and in the Iranian case the most recent synthetic rate appears 
to be a good predictor of the future real rate. 
Interestingly, there was some evidence of small tempo effects in the synthetic 
measures of mean durations of birth intervals, but these effects were not sufficiently 
large to produce tempo effects in each of the parity progressions, and hence in the total 
fertility rate. This tends to support the argument made by McDonald and Kippen (2011) 
relating to the case of Australia, that tempo effects are dominated by changes that occur 
in the age at first birth. In the Iran case, at least in recent times, there has been very little 
change in the age at first birth. The analysis gives no support to the concern that fertility 
in Iran has tumbled to 1.5 births per woman. 
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Since this paper was first presented at the IUSSP International Population 
Conference in Busan in August 2013, the debate in Iran about the draft bill has 
progressed. The bill is still before the parliament but is now being debated in the 
context of a statement by the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, issued on 30 
May 2014. Where the draft bill provides a specific target fertility rate of 2.5 births per 
woman, the Supreme Leader’s statement is more moderate, stating that fertility should 
be increased “to a higher rate than the rate of sub-replacement fertility”. There is no 
reference in the statement to any sub-group of the population being favored in job 
allocation; instead the statement encourages the improvement of the employment 
prospects of all the working population. The statement does not recommend the 
curtailment of family planning services but is supportive of improvements in the 
delivery of reproductive health. However, the statement still encourages “youth to 
marry at a younger age” (Population and Development Review 2014). There are no 
time lines in the statement as there were in the draft bill. It is also evident that the fiscal 
implications of the draft bill are unsustainable in the current strained economic situation 
in Iran.  
Our findings support the view that there is no need for Iran to introduce some of 
the more severe measures proposed in the draft population law such as discrimination 
against single people or women in the labor market, and that Iran has time to implement 
family support policies in order to sustain fertility near the replacement level. Research 
in Europe has shown that employment insecurity for young people has a negative effect 
on their fertility and on couple formation (see, for example, Lundstrom and Andersson 
2012). The Iranian Government should be looking for policy measures that enhance the 
incomes of young people. With a greater sense of security, young people are more 
likely to marry and have children. Within the fiscal constraints, the focus of policy 
should be upon family support measures, several of which are included in the draft law, 
and upon policies that enable couples to balance work and family. 
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